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THE EFFECT OF THE NORM OF RECI?ROCITY IN A TWO-PERSON
NON-ZERO-SUM GAME
Game theory has been subjected to much research
in recent years (Deutsch, 1960; Oskamp & Perlman,

1965; Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh, & Lipetz, 1959).

In the

Deutsch (1960) �xperiment, §splayed an interpersonal

game Nhich, in one position, required them to choose
between being trusting or suspicious of a:1other and, in
second position,·required them to choose between be
ing trustworthy or untrustworthy toward another.
There vras a tendency for .§_s who were trusting to be----- - _
trust worth

--

-

and. for Ss who were suspicious to be un- ... .,_
tr1..1.stworthy:. 0,..§__kamp and Perlman (1965) have shoi;,m

--

that the wording of the instructions to the Ss and the

--

amount of communication allovted between Ss are significant variables in producing changes in §s behavior.
1.·,n1.e:n words such as "play, n "win," and "game," for
example, were omitted from
to behave more

nication was

�.:!:..J..i,,Ll=,L_J.J...U...w...L.4:,;-w.i.1;a:-t:5cbfftt��o-..i...e::&1,,���__'.::2�P�er
� e� �,t�e rather
than co�pete. Related experiments by Scodel et al.

(1959) have stressed the importance of the particular
game employed and the type of problems the Ss must
1

2

face.

Some games are so inherently conducive to com

petition that Ss compete regardless of the wording of
the instructions or the communications allowed.
Game theory states that a person will behave in
such a way as to mAximize satisfaction.

The crucial

- .

_yariable in predicting the behavior of an individual in
°i·Jhat action will result in the greatest satisfaction.
Satisfaction is not necessarily identical with mone
tary gain.

Several studies, for example, have snown

that the desire to do better than the other play�r may

--

be rr,ore satisfying than maximizing personal gain

(Lutzker, 1960; Minas, Scodel, Marlowe, & Rawson, 1960;
3apoport & Cha�nah, 1965).
The experiment reported here involves pairs of Ss
in i:,rhat is called non-zero-sum games.

one in which the eains made bv one
..------------"""------'�--

not necessarily ma.ci._e_a: tbe_e..x.:ge;ose of another.

--

A

contest in which two peo.'.)le compete for a prize set by
a third party is an_exaw�le
the loser does not suffer a loss ea:ual to the prj_ze- -
obtained by the winner_ ( the prize won by on

. l�r_

and the "nothing" won by thee other player adds to form
a value other than zero7-.-This type of game is dis
tinguished from the zero-sum-game where one player's

3
gain must be equal to the other pla,yer 's loss.

Two

people matching coins would be an example of this type
(the prize won by one player and the prize lbst by the
other player have a net value of zero).
Mo�srch in gam@-be,h:;;rni or ha,

the following form:

t�ken

the game is played by two per-

-----

choices per trial in the game, A1 and B for player 1,
1
and A2 and B2 for player 2. There are four possible

The expression (x , xj de
i
notes the· value of the outcome to the players. The-

outcomes on each trial.

first symbol re__fer� �B�for player 1, and
the second to pl2yor 2.

The getr-e'".ca::r payoff matrix is

sho1,m in Table 1.
The game matrixes which were used in this inves
tigation ere shovm in Table 2.

In the first game

(matrix X), plr,�8r 2 has absolute control over his
winnings and the winnings of player 1.

If player 2

plays A , he receives 1 point and player 1 receives 5
2
points, independent of the choice of A or B1 by player
1
1. If player 2 plays B , he receives 1 point while
2
player 1 receives O points. Player 1 is said to be in
a
hi

11

.,sitting duck" position since he ha

----the

control over

other player's winnings.

The A play for both players, in both games ex-

Table 1
General Payoff Matrix Used In
Game Theory Studies
Player 2

Player 1

X

1'
X J'

X
X

1

2

x
x
2, .),,
X ,
4

X

4j

Note.- Player 2 chooses between A and B .
Player 1 chooses between A2
and B12•
1
There are four t)ossible outcomes.
The outcomes ar� represented by the
four-different cells. Within each cell
there are two values (x., x.). The
symbol on the left in elch dell refers to
the winnings of player 1, the right to
player 2.

·5

Table 2
The Two GB.me Matrixes
Used In The Experiment

Matrix X _
-

.,

A

2

5, 1

Player 1

5, 1

Al
Bl

0, 1 -,

Matrix y

....
Player 1

Player

Player 2
B

A
2

3, 3
4,

0

2

o, 4

-1,-1

6
cept the

11

sj_ tting duck;' is considered the cooperative

response since this choice is viewed as an attempt to
maximize the gains of both players.

The B play is

considered the competitive response since this play is
viewed as an attempt to maximize personal gain by the
exploitation of cooperative action by the other player.
Cooperation and competition have been studied in
this way primarily through the use of a game called
the Prisoner's .Dilemm·a (PD game).

In this type of

game, x. values are subject to the following restric1

tions:
i•

ii.
iii.

iv.

2x > x + x > 2x
2
3
1
4
x
x:3 > 1
XJ) X2

X4> X

2
An example of a PD game is given by Scodel et al.

(1959), v-:here x -:::: .3, x ::.o, x :::5, and x4::.1. This
1
2
3
game is sho1,,m in matrix: form in Table J. The original

anecdote called the Prisoner's Dilem�a concerns two
prisoners accused of the same crime.

Each must decide

·whether or not to confess to the crime.

If both con

fess, both will be convicted; if neither confesses,
both will be acquitted for lack of evidence.

However,

if only one of the prisoners confesses, he not only

7

Table J
The Prisoner's Dilemma
Game Used By Scodel (1959)

A

Player 1

Al
Bl

2

Player 2

3, 3
5,

0

B
2

o, 5

1' 1

,1.

8

goes free but gets a rei:,rc,r-d for having turned sta,te I s
witness.

The prisoner who refused to confess gets a

more severe sentence than if he had confessed.

The

dilemma involves the idea that it is best to confess
regardle8s of what the other does, but _at the same
time it is better for both prisoners not to confess
than to confess.

In the PD game matrix, the A and B

responses are analogous to "not confess" and

11

confess,

11

res:pectively.
In most experimental stucUcs of PD ea,mes, the
fre�ue�cies of individual cooperative responses or of
joiLtly cooperative responses in runs of repeated
plays have been the dependent variables.

Instructions

to the :players, the payoffs, the number of games in a
run, and the different population samples have been
the usual independent variables.

Some experimenters

have sought to explore the possible relationships
beti;·reen the tendencies for .§.s to cooperate and person
ality factors such as authoritarianism and trust
(Deutsch, 196 0), internationalism (Lutzker, 196 0), and
sex (Komorita, 1965; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965).

The

Deutsch (1960) study suggested that high authoritarian
personality types, as measured by the F scale, tend to
be competitive, untrusting, and untrustworthy in their
game choices.

The Lutzker (196 0) study showed that

9
internationalists differed from isolationists in that
they were more cooperative and more reluctant to aban
don efforts at cooperation.

In the Komorita (1965)

experiment, female Ss tended to cooperate with a co
operative, simulated partner ·while mal-fi §_s tended t.o
co.npete with any-- ty9�. of simulated partner.

Using a

different procedure, Rapo,ort and Chammah (1965) found
males to be generally more coouerative than females.
Wnen males played females, hoNever, they. beca:ne more
while the females became more cooperative.
These experiments demonstrated that all of these
factors have had some effect upon the level of coop
eration in a PD game, but the dominant response, even
for ttw ,,r-ost

2:::-,r, ""rati ve

groups, is the competitive

-

one -- about 70% of all resnonses (Deutsch, 1960;
Komorita, 1965; Lutzker, 1960; Oskamp & Perl�an,

1965).

For the purposes of this experiment, a variation
of the PD game was introduced in

11 hich

restrictions i,

ii, and iii hold, but not iv (these restrictions are
defined on page 6).

This variation creates a more

neutral matrix which should result in a more sensitive
�easurement of the effects of the independent variable
(cooperation as measured by the A response).

For this

reason, matrix Y shown in Table 2 was constructed.

10
As mentioned above, past experiments have shotm
that 1s display a strong tendency to play B, the co�
petitive response.

It is hypothesized that these re

sults are d e to a culturally imposed norm ,,rhi ch leads
strategy over a coopera
tive one.

By playing a cooperative response, a player

runs the potential risk of being taken advantage of.
In other words, a player may feel that an attempted
collaboration will not be reciprocated by the other
)layer.

If a player felt that his coo?erative action

would likely be reciprocated by the other player, the
problem of exploitation is lessened, and that player
should be more motivated to choose the cooperative
strategy over the competitive one.
Sociologists consider the norm of reciprocity to
be one of the r.'10st iID})O:!'.:tant conce�;ts j_n the analysis
of social behavior (Becker, 1956; Gouldner, 1960;
Malinowski, 19J2).

Becker (1956} implies that reci-

procity is an innate characteristic of all men which
leads them to respond to others as they respond to
hirr..

According to Malinowski, reciprocity is a moral

norrr. in society which is leari1ed through socialization:
You should conform to rules; you
should return benefits to those

11
who give you benefits (19.32, p.
39).

According to Gouldner (1960), the norm of reciprocity
is universal.

In its universal form, reciprocity

ms.kes two demands:

(1) people should help those who

have helped them, and (2), people shouid not injure
those ��o have helped them.

Gouldner also states that

the reciprocity norm stipulates that the amount of the
return to be made should be equivalent to what had
been received.

Gouldner also expresses the feeling

that the norm serves two important functions in soci
ety:

(1) the norm serves as a group stabilizing func

tion, and (2), it is a starting mechanism in that it
helps to initia.t� social interaction.
The basic ::rnrpose of this experiment was to ex
pl Jre the effect of this norm of reciprocity on game
behavior.

The general hypothesis tested was that Ss

would show a tendency to reciprocate the behavior of
their partner.

,.,

;.
l,;'

12 .·
HYPOTH:SSES
The foll01·Ting hypotheses were made, based on the
norm of reciprocity, regarding the expected cooperation
levels between groups.
1. (a) Players faced with a relatively coopera
tive partner in the first game will recipro
cate this cooperative behavior.
(b) If.hypothesis 1a holds, this cooperative
relationship will be extended to the second
game.
2. (a) Players faced :dth a relatively competitive ,artner in the first game will recipro
cate this competitive behavior.
(b) If hypothesis 2a holds, this competitive
relationship will be extended to the second

J.

game.
Players faced with a relatively cooperative
partner in the first game and unable to re
ciprocate this behavior in the first game,
will reciprocate cooperative behavior in the
second game.

4. Players faced with a relatively competitive
partner in the first game and unable to re-

lJ
ciprocate this behavior in the first game,
will reciprocate competitive behavior in the
second game.

5. Players will not cooperate when they expect
that their partner will not reciprocate co
operative behavior.

14

METHOD
Subiects

....

96 female students at Kalamazoo Christian High

School

(JS% of the population) volunteered to serve in

pairs as Ss.

Kalamazoo Christian High School is a

paroc�ial institution, attracting middle class students
from the Protest1:int Reformed churches.

Female Ss were

chosen in light of the Komorita (1965) experiment
which indicated that female Ss seem to be more aware
of and influenced by the behavior of their partner
than male §.s.
The procedure for recruiting §.s was as follows:
At the start of each school period, the male E and the
prL1cipal entered the study hall.

The principal a.sked

for the attention of the students and introduced the E
as being from Western :'lichigan Unive:rsity and in need
of volunteers for an experiment.

The Ethen announced

that the volunteers had to be girls who did not consid
er themselves best of friends and that only two girls
cou.ld be taken during that period.

It was also stated

that the experimental task consisted of playing a
game.
P_ll of the Ss were acquainted with one another
and their ages ranged from 14 to 18.

None of the Ss

15
h?d ever been involved in games of the type used in
this experiment when they entered the experimental
room.

16
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AppGratus and Procedure
Pairs of Ss entered the experimental room together and were seated on opposite sides of a parti
tion (see Fig. 1).

The .§.s were told they could not

speak to one another.

A table on which was a panel

containing a button labeled A and a button labeled B
and a card containing the appropriate game matrix was
placed before each§.

At right angles to the parti

tion separating the .§.s a second partition which screen
ed each S from

g was placed.

On E's side of the par

tition a panel with four lights which were wired to
.§.�s panel was loc8.ted.

This setup enabled E to deter-

21ine what play had been made by each.§. on each trial.
All trials were 15 seconds long.

For ease of handling

and economy, the points on the matrix were represented
by poker chips.

The appropriate chip was delivered to

S after each trial through a small slot in the parti
tion between Sand E.

Each chip had a number written

on it which referred to the number of points won on
that trial.

The Ss were told that the object of the

gsme 1•Jas to collect as many points for themselves as
they could (the complete instructions given to the Ss
are presented below).

The beginning of trials was

indicated by the sound of a small bell mounted on E's
side of the table.

17

E.---

Fig. 1.

�

The,apparatus used in the experiment.

s2
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Desin1
There were eight groups involved in the design.
Twelve §s were fandomly placed in each group.

Although

all ,'3s were led to believe they were playing each
other (except for a control group -- group VIII) they
were actually playing against a set of pre-programmed
responses designed by�.
The Ss of group I 1·Tere exposed to the following
conditions:
1. They-ulayed 10 trials from the player 1 posi
tion of matrix X, while the other player (so
they were led to believe) played from the
player 2 position, and received 8 A2 (coopera
tive) responses from�2. They played 10 trials from the player 2 posi
tion of matrix X, while the other player be-

J.

came player 1.
They played. 20 trials from either position of
matrix Y.

(In this condition, the §'s first

response Nas matched by�-

For the last 19

trials the S played against her
sponse.

01-m

last re

This procedure, used by Komorita

(1965), and called a lag one condition, pre
sumably communicates to the S that she is
faced with a person who will cooperate if she

19
d.oes).
The procedure was the same for .§_s of group II
except that in condition 1 (the first 10 trials) they
received only 2 A responses from�2
The Ss of group III were exposed only to condi
tion J for a total of 20 trials.
The Ss of group IV received conditions 1 (the
first 10 trials) and J (the last 20 trials).
The Ss of group V were exposed to only conditions
1 and J, but in condition 1 (the first 10 trials) they
received only 2 A

responses from E.
2
The Ss of group VI received conditions 2 (the

first 10 trials) and J (the last 20 trials).
The .§.s of group VII were exposed to all condi
tions, but in the order 2 (the first 10 trials), 1 (the
next 10 trials), and J (the last 20 trials).

The re

sponses the S made under con�ition 2 were reciprocated
by fin condition 1.
The §s of group VIII were exposed only to condi
tion J for 29 trials.

Before their exposure, they were

told that thPy were not )laying against each other but
a s5t of pre-programmed responses.
}.fter the..., ·::::; a.mes ·were played, each .§. was briefly
and informally intervie��d by�-

Before leaving the

experimental room, all �s were asked not to discuss

20

the experiment with anyone.

21

Ins true t j_ 0::1.s
The following instructions were read to all Ss in
every group 2xc��t croup VIII.
From now on, please do not talk to one
another. This is ,,,hat I 1,rant you to do.
You will l!e pl::�yj_ng a game. The object of
this game is to collect as many points for
yourself as you can. This is how the game
is played.
You see before you a panel with two but
tons, button A and button B. You also see
a card with an A and a B written on the top
and side of the card (this is demonstrated).
The numbers on the card refer to the
points you and the other player can win in
the game. You are to be player 1 (� points
to the S seated to the left of E) and you
ari to be player 2 (E points to-the§ seat
ed to the right of :§J.
Player 1, you play from this side position,
and player 2, you play from this top posi
tion (� demonstrates).
vPnen the game begins, you can do one of
two things. You can press button A or you
can press button B. Now since both of you
co.n do tvro things, four things cGn happen.
�hese four things sre represented by the
four boxes on your card (E demonstrates).
For exam9le, if you press-A and the other
person presses A, you get J points and she
gets J points. If you press A and the oth
er person presses B 9 you get nothing and
she gets 4 points. If you press B and the
other person presses A, you get 4 points
and the other person gets nothing. If you
press Band the other person presses B, you
both lose a 9oint.
Do you boyh underst;nd?
tions at this point?

Are there any ques

Payoffs are to be in poker chips which
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you will receive at the end of each trial.
They will be delivered through this slot
(E G.Gui.c;.,.:::; J:;r·a.tes). Each chiu has a number
vrritten on it. This refers-to the number
of points that you have won on that trial.
Are there any questions?
To nake sure that you understand the
game, I'm going to ask you a few questions;
then we'11 have a few· warm--up tr1als; then
I'll ask a few more questions and the game
will begin.
The start of each trial will be signaled
by the sound of this bell (E demonstrates).
Wt1en you hear the bell, I want you to press
the button of your choice for about two
seconds--- This ·will tell me what both of
you have played 8nd then I will give you
the chip that you have won.
Here are the auestions. (1) Player 1,
let's say you play A and receive this chiu
(a J �oint chip is showfl). i,n1at did the other player play? How many points did the
other player get? ( Ans1·,rer correct is A and
J). Player 2, did you understand that?
(2) Player 2, let's say you play A and re
ceive this O point (a O point chip is shown).
W'nat did the other player play? How many
points did she get? (.Answer correct is B
and 4). Player 1, did you understand that?
(J) Player 1, let's say you play Band re
ceive this chip (a -1 point chip is shoim.).
What did the other player play? How many
points did she get? (P...nswer correct is B
and -1). Player 2, did you understand
that?
The questions were repeated, player 1 being asked
q_uestion nunber 1,' and. player 2 being asked questions 1
and

J.

If a S failed to answer one or more of the ques

tions correctly, crucial elements involving the game
·were repeated. c:..::d supplementary questions vrere o.sked.

2.3

Only when a� was able to answer all questions cor
rectly did the game begin.

To further insure the Ss

understanding of the game, six practice trials were run,
and each� was E).sked one final question.
The procedure and instructions were ;TIOc.ified for
Ss of group VIII.

For this group, a game matrix was

not provided, and £S played �he &ame one at a time.
The instructions to the Ss of group VIII were as follows:
This is what I want you to do. You will
be playing a game. The object of the game
is to collect as many points for yourself
as yo1J can. This is how the game is played.
You see before you a panel with two but
tons -- button A and button B. I·.fr1en you
press button A two things can happen.
You will "-.::i ther ·win J points or O points.
Wnen you press button B two things can
happen. You will either win 4 points or
you will lose a point.
This really is not a game of chance oi
luck. Depending on how you play, you
could end up with a very high score or a
high negative score.
Do you have any questions?
Before the game begins, I'll ask you a
few questions, then you will have a few
wa·rm up trials, and tb.en the game will
begin.
Other mechanical aspects of the game were ex
plained, as above, and the game proceeded.
The instructions for the matrix X game varied
vit� groups.

In all th�re were four different sets of

24

instru.cti ons.

The fallowing instructions were comJnon

to all groups involved in this game (groups I, II, IV,
V, VI, and VII).
Before you play this game, you will first
play this game (the matrix X game is given
to the Ss). This game is played exactly
the sarr,.e way as the game I just e·xplained.
The only difference is that there are dif
ferent numbers written in the boxes. As
you can see, player 1 is helpless to player
2 in this game. If player 2 plays A, play
er 2 gets 1 point and player 2 gets 5
points -- regardless of whether player 1
plays A 01- 3.
Questions were again asked to test the Ss under
�-

standing of the game matrix.
The following further instructions were given to
groups I and II.
One of you will be player 1 and the other
will be player 2 for 10 trials. Then the
game will be sto';ped and the person that
was player 1 will become player 2 and the
person that �filS player 2 will become player
1 for another 10 trials.
I cannot tell you which of you will first
be player 2 until just before the game be
gins. This is because I have found that
some Ss make deals or threats if they know
this Eefore the game begins. Just before
the game bee;ins I will give you a card
which repeats the instructions of the game
and ex9lains which person is to first be
�)layer 2.
Are there any questions? This is your
last chance to ask questions. After I
give you this card explaining what you are
to d.o, you can no longer ask me questions
or talk to the other player.

25
If there were no further questions, the following
instructions were corn.muni.c�3.ted via a J x 5 csrd.
In this zame you will first be player 1.
It does not matter what button you press
from this position. Pl&yer 2 determines
1,hc.t buth of you ".•ri 11 win.
After 10 trials of being player 1, you
will become player- 2 while the other play
er becomes player 1. When you are player
2 it is very impo:ctant what button you
press since you determine �hat you win and
what the other player wins.
As you can see, you will win 1 point no
matter what button you press. But
if
you press A, the other person wins 5; if
you press B, the other person wins 0.
No talking at any time -- not to me or
the other player. If you need extra time
to think or re-read the instructions, ask
for a time out.
The instructions Nere the same for the §.s of group
VII except that on their cards they were instructed
that they would first be player 2.
The following instructions were common to groups
IV, V, and VI.
One of you will be player 1 and the other
will be pl9.yer 2 for 10 trials. I cannot
tell you who 11,:ill be player 1 and who will
be player 2 until just before the game be
gins. This is because I have found that
some Ss make deals or threats before the
game begins. Just before the game begins
I will give you a card which. repeats the
instructions of the game and explains
·,,!hich ·person is to be :=ilayer 1 and which
persbn.is to be plAyer 2.

26
A question and answer period followed.

The Ss

were told that they could not speak to anyone after
they received their cards.
The cards 3iven to .Ss of groups IV and V read as
follo�,rs:
In this game you will be player 1. It
does not matter whe.t button you press.
Pl:3.ye:r 2 determines •,\That both of you will
win.
If the other player presses A, you get 5
points; if the other player presses B, you
get O. The other player always gets 1 point,
no matter what buttons are pressed.
No talking at any time -- not to me or
the other player. If you need extra time
to think or re-read the instructions, ask
fo:r a time out.

.

The cards given to the .Ss of group VI read as
follo·vJS:
In this game you will be player 2. It is
very important 1�ich button you press. As
you can see, the other player has no control
over her winnings/or yours. When you press
A, the other player gets 5 points. WDen
you press B, the other player gets O points.
You will always get 1 point, no matter
vrha..t buttons are �Jressed.
No talking at any time -- not to me or
the other player. If you need extra time
to think or re-read the instructions, ask
for a time out.
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RESULTS
The results of the matrix X game are presented
in Table 4.

Th� mean number of cooperative responses

from the player 2 positj_on of the matri-x X game was.
significantly greater for _§s of group I than for Ss of
group II ( t-:::::
2. 627, n -<.. 01). ' If the norm of reciproc.

ity were the sole variable operative, it would be ex
pected that each_§ in group I would make 8 cooperative
responses while each_§ in group II would make only 2
2
cooperative choices. AX test indicated that both
groups differed significantly from this theoretical

.....

2
dr�-- '1 ' .;;;,,
1--< • 01·' oo-ro"D
• u·m (?.:r·o
?0.78, 11
.·,r.""'xl·m
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�
"'- p T_, ::x::. -_ -

,u�

x
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=-

20.00, df-= 1, Qz.01).
Group VI was signJ. ficantly more cooperative than

group VII in the m:=,trix X game (t::::1.820, Q.-'.05).
None of the groups involved in the matrix Y
game differed significantly from one another (F=.624).
The results of this game are presented in Table

5.

Group III, a control sroup in the experiment, made
the cooperative choice on 47.92% of all trials.
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Table 4
Mean Frequency Of Cooperative
Choices From Player 2 Position
Of Matrix X Game

Grou·o
I
II

VI
VII

Means

% of

Coo-:-:J. Choices

5.58J
2.BJJ

55.BJ
28.JJ

1.917

19.17

.925

9.25

t

12.

2.627 -<.01

1. 820

<- 05
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Table 5
Mean Frequency Of Cooperative
Choices Of Matrix Y Game

C-rouo
I

Meo.ns

9.250

II

9.500

III

9.583

% of

COOi).

46.25

Choices

F

. 624 ➔:-

42.50
47.92

IV

10.750

53.75

V

10.250

51.25

VI

10.500

VII

11.500

V7. I l

11.417

52.50
57.50

57.09

":-:,: ot significant. An F ratio of 2.17 is needed at
the .05 level of confidence.
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DISCUSSION
The signific2.nt difference (t�2.627, 12.< .01)
obtained between groups I and II support hypotheses
la and 2a.

In general, cooperative behavior can be

induced through the nor� of reciprocity.

Ss faced

with a more cooperative partner tended to reciprocate
this behavior and Ss faced with a partner less coop
erative tended to reciproc�te that behavior in the
�atrix X game.

Theoretically, each§ in group I

should have chosen 8 cooperative responses as player
2, while each pl8.yer in group I I should have chosen
2 cooperative resuonses in order to extablish a true
reciprocal relationship.

Actually, only 1 § in group

I gave 8 cooperative responses after receiving 8 co
OJerative responses from her partner; only 2 §s in
group II gave 2 cooperative responses after receiving
2 cooperative responses from her partner.

Apparently

§_s do not feel obligated, as the norm stipulates, to
re-c,ur1·1 be,-::::'::.-::: ::,c8ctly equal to tho'se received -- at
least not in this game setting.
Hypotheses lb and 2b were not supported by the
data.

The norm of reciprocity states that the nature

of the social interactio� established between two
pe o;Jle tends to he come •1ui te stable.

This v.ras not

Jl
found to be the case in this experiment -- some of the
most ooo�erative Ss in the first game of group� turned
highly competitive in the second game, while competi
tive Ss in group II's first game sometimes turned coo _:,era tive.

The §_s appo.r·en tly have the a.bi li ty to dis

associate the experience of the first game from the
second game.

This seems to be the only reasonable

axpla�ation concerning the fact that none of the groups
in the second game differs significantly from one another •.
One of the most surprising findings was that
group III (control group) did not differ significantly
from group VIII (single player group).

Game theorists

assume in games of this tyJe that the S's awB.reness of
playing against another Sis a major factor in deter
:nining his strategy.

The conclusion reached in most of

game theory studies is that� chooses a strategy lead
ing to doing better than the other S rather than a
sttategy that maximizes personal gain.

In repeated

.,lays of a PD game, these two objectives are usually
mutually exclusive.

Grap VIII §s, playing a PD game,

were not playing against another player and their in
structions were loaded to ,reduce maximizing personal
:ain stratezy.

In this case, both responses must �e

.interpreted as aR effort to increase personal gain.
All of the Ss in this group were able to indicate in

J2
��eir 1nterviews that they were more likely to win by
_playing A than B.

Most Ss felt that it was worth the

chance to play B occasionally because 4 points could
be won.

No Sin this group felt that a steady A play

�ould maxi�ize her gain.
Since a null hypothesis can never be totally
accepted without the possibility of error of inter
pretation 51 the lack of a significant difference be
tween these groups in this study certainly does not
prove that there is no real difference between these
groups.

However, the absence of an obtained difference

does indicate that comparison groups of the type used
in this experiment may be needed in game research.
�-Jhen an experimenter observes that a .§, plays a ga1ne
competitively and fails to maximize personal gain,
that experimenter cannot infer that that Sis moti�:
vated by a need.to do better than the other player
unless proper comparison groups are employed.
One might expect that the .§,s of group VIII would
learn to play A as the game progressed since consecu
tive A plays resulted in a gain of J poi�ts per trial
��ile conseculivc B plays resulted in a loss of 1
point per trial.

Actually, one more

.ti�

play was made

in the first 5 trials (J4) than in the last 5 trials
( JJ).

This seems to indicate that Ss vrere not learn-
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ing the strategy that �ould have led them to the
3reatest gain since a total of 60 A plays could have
been made in the last 5 trials.
Hypotheses
data.

3 and 4 were also not supported by the

Groups IV and V (as did I and lI) represented

an attempt to influence the behavior of Ss in a game
through the experience of a previous game.

Groups IV

and V differed from I and II in that these Ss did not
have the opportunity of playing from the player 2
�osition in the first game.

According to the norm of

r2ciprocity, these Ss should have felt an obligation
to cooperate (group IV) and to compete (group V) in
the. second game.

The norm was effective in producing

dif/erences in behavior for groups_ I and II as mea.sur-'
ed by responses from the player 2 position of the
first game.

Apparently the §_s of groups IV and V were

urone to reciprocate the actions of the other player
s.t the conclusion of the first game.

It seems that

this variable was too weak to ·0roduce differences be
tween groups in the more complex second game.
Virtually all of the experimenters in game theory
have stressed the importance of understanding that §_s
are reacting to aspects of the social interaction in�
vol vecl i:·1hcn two peo)le are playing a same.

It has

been assumed that- the two primary goals of Ss are to

(1) �beat" the other ulsyer and (2) to maximize per
sonal gain.

Over a long run of plays, competiti�e

responses are typically interpreted as reflecting the
r_28c.. of a S to d.o better thsn the other player, while
cooperative responses are typically_ interpreted as
reflecting the need to maximize personal gain.

Since

�ost experimenters have found the competitive response
to be dominant, it has been generally concluded that
the need to c:.o better than the other olayer is the
pri�arj motivation for Kost §s.

In prior research,

- -- these ti-ro major varia.bles r,rere never controlled.

In

the present experiment, maximizing of personal gains
was controlled in groups VI and VII in the matrix X
game.

The �s of group VI ,1ayed only from the player

2 position.

They always received 1 point for them

selves and could determine the other player 9 s winnings
on every trial for 10 trials.

Seven of the 12 Ss in

this 3roup gave as many or more points (10) to the
other player as they received.
cooperative responses
. ..._L,s (0 to
,-,05 po1n
9 • >_.,

The mean number of

as 1.917 (0 to 10 possible) or

1:,, 1

50 possible) given to the other

_::.layer.
The :procec]_ure t•ras the same for £5roup VII except
thG.t they lrnev• they 1·rould b8 ""9layer 1 later and thus
u�der the control oi the other player.

Four of the 12
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Ss in this group gave as many or more points to the
other player as they received..

The mean number of

cooperative responses was only .925 (0 to 10 possible)
or 4.625 points (0 to 50 possible) given to the other
:9la.yer.

As was shoi:•m in Table L�, the difference be

tween these groups was significant at the .05 level of
confidence.

These data sup9ort hypothesis

5.

One of

the reasons for a S to choose a competitive strategy,
other than "beating" �he other player, involves the
S's expectation that cooperation will not be recip
rocated..

Introspective accounts by .§_s support this

internretation.

In the large majority of instances,

�s verbalized that they played B because they expected
the other player to play B when positions were reversed.
When asked why A was not played more, the most fre
quent responses were, "If I played A, she would get
more :9oit1t.s ''

ec,::.c.,

n 1tJhen

she became player 2, she might

not want to give me too many -points."
The .§.s of group VI, when questioned concerning
their strategy in the game, typically reported, "Since
I was told only to collect as many points for myself
as I could, I could not decide what to give the other
player."

The majority of Ss also indicated that they

did not consider doing better than the other player
as ir::portant.
1

J6
Perhaps a more effective manipulation of the independ�nt variable was needed in this investigation.
A catalyst, such as havin� the Ss explain their be:"13Vior to each other after the game, would probably
be helpful in turning the hehavior of Ss in the direction of the hy,otheses presented.
1,r•=:,•

As the experiment

.s designed, social intera.cti on was held at a mini-

�um -- and this is probably one of the most important
conditions involved in 9roducing reciprocal behavior.
�rhe problems encountered in game research a.re
characteristic of the b.s..sic dilemma involved in the
study of human social interaction.

For the purpose

of systematic investigation, it is desirable to place
_ �ertain restrictions upon the interaction situation
in order to isolate what may be the effective condi
tions.

For example, the behavj_ or available to each

person nay be limited to a choice of one of two alter
natives� a limit may be set on the amount and nature
of the information av�ilable to each person; and the
number of persons in the interaction may be set.

The

6.s.:ne situation provides a setting in which these var
iables are clearly defined and controlled.

But then

the question as to the validity of this setting as
representing "real-life" social interaction arises.
Ad�ittedly, laboratory exnerimentation reduces this

J?
interaction to near meaningless proportions.

It is

felt that this must be done in order to measure ��at
may be the significant variables.

This study indicates

that perhans even more restrictions may be necessary
in game research to uncover subtle variables involved
j_n the interaction, but, at the same time, care must
be taken in regard to the elimination of crucial ele
ments involved in the interaction.

JS
SUM�ARY
Several hypotheses were tested involving the
nature of the norm of reciprocity in game behavior.
High school girls served in pairs as Ss and were di
vided into eight groups.
employed.

Two non-zero-sum games were

In the first game, one Shad absolute con-·

trol over the winnings of both players.

In the second

game, a varj_ation of the Prisoner's Dilemma, both
players shared equal power over the winnings.

No sig

nificant differences were found with regard to coopera
tive behavior between any of the groups in the second
game.

Significant differences in the first game sup

uorted the hypotheses that (1) players tend to recip
rocate the behayior of their partner, and (2), players
do not cooperate when they do not expect reciprocal
behavior from their partner.
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